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INTRODUCTION 
WE HAVE RECENTLY raised in the Communist Party the problem of 
strengthening our work in steeling the Party spirit of our members. 
I have heard that the Central Committee has also adopted a decision 
on this subject, and we hope to receive it shortly. In order to strengthen 
our work in steeling the Party spirit of our members we are going to 
launch a concrete ideological struggle within the Party against the 
various undesirable phenomena which run counter to the Party spirit. 
But what is the correct way for us to conduct this ideological struggle 
within the Party, and what would be an incorrect way? This is the 
very question I want to discuss. 
Everyone knows that our Party is a proletarian party, a party that 
leads the struggles of the broad masses. If the Party is to fulfill the 
historical tasks it has shouldered, it must fight against the enemies of 
the revolution at various periods, and must unite with the various re-
volutionary strata and classes. 
Right from the day of its birth, our Party has never for a single 
moment lived in any environment but that of serious struggle. The 
Party and the proletariat have constantly lived inside the encirclement 
of various non-proletarian classes--the big bourgeoisie, the petty bour-
geoisie, the peasantry and even the remnants of feudal forces. All these 
classes, when they are struggling against the proletariat or when they 
are co-operating with it, utilize the unstable elements within the Party 
and the proletariat to penetrate into the heart of the Party and the prole-
tariat and constantly influence the Party and the proletariat in ideology, 
in living habits, in theory and in action. This is the origin of all kinds 
of erroneous and undesirable tendencies within the Party. It is the 
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social basis of all kinds of opportunism within the Party, and it is also 
the source of inner-Party struggles. 
Inner-Party struggles are a reflection of the class struggles outside 
the Party. 
From the very day of its inception, our Party has struggled not only 
against the enemies outside the Party but also against all kinds of 
hostile and non-proletarian influences inside the Party. These two 
k.inds of struggle are different, but both are necessary and have a com-
mon class substance. If our Party did not carryon the latter type of 
struggle, if it did not struggle constantly within the Party against all 
undesirable tendencies, if it did not constantly purge the Party of 
every type of non-proletarian ideology and overcome both "left" and 
Right opportunism, then such non-proletarian ideology and such 
"Left" and Right opportunism might gain ground in the Party and 
influence or even dominate our Party. This would make it impossible 
for the Party to consolidate and develop itself or to preserve its inde-
pendence. This would endanger the Party and lead to its degenera-
tion. Such non-proletarian ideology and "Left" or Right opportunism 
can corrupt our Party, or certain sections of it, and can even transform 
the character of our Party or sections of it into that of a non-proletarian 
organization. For example, it was in this manner that the Social-
Democratic parties in Europe were corrupted by bourgeois ideology 
and transformed into political parties of a bourgeois type, thus becom-
ing the main social pillars of the bourgeoisie. 
Therefore, such inner-Party struggle is absolutely necessary and 
cannot be avoided. Any idea of trying to avoid inner-Party struggle, 
or of refraining from criticizing others' mistakes so that they will not 
criticize one's own errors, is totally wrong. 
Inner-Party struggles consist principally of ideological struggles. 
Their content is made up of the divergencies and antagonisms arising 
in matters of ideology and principle. The divergencies and antagonisms 
among our comrades on matters of ideology and principle can develop 
into political splits within tae Party, and, under certain circumstances, 
even to inevitable organizational splits; but, in character and content, 
such divergencies and antagonisms are basically ideological struggles. 
Conseque1?-tly, any inner-Party struggle not involving divergencies 
in matters of ideology and principle and any conflict among Party 
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members not based on divergencies in matters of principle is a type 
of unprincipled struggle, a struggle without content. This kind of 
struggle without principle or content is utterly unnecessary within the 
Party. It is detrimental and not beneficial to the Party . Every Party 
member should strictly avoid such struggles. 
Inner-Party struggle is absolutely indispensable to protecting the 
purity and independence of the Party, to guaranteeing that the Party's 
activities constantly proceed along lines which represent the highest 
interests of the proletariat, and to preserving the Party's basic prole-
tarian character. With this object in view, inner-Party struggles must 
be conducted from two sides, or on two fronts. This is because the 
enemy's ideology influences the Party from two directions, attacking 
the Party from both the Right and the "Left." This is expressed in the 
Party by Right or "Left" opportunism. 
Therefore, our inner-Party struggle must be directed simultaneously 
against both Right opportunism and "Left" opportunism, against these 
two aspects so that our Party can preserve its definite proletarian char-
acter. If we fail to do this, if we merely carryon a one-sided struggle, 
or if we slacken our vigilance and our struggle against either side, then 
the enemy not only can but assuredly will attack our Party from that 
very side which we have neglected. In that case, it will be impossible 
to preserve the Party's purity and independence or to consolidate the 
Party. It is, therefore, in the course of ceaseless inner-Party struggle 
on two fronts that our Party consolidates and develops itself. 
Comrade Stalin said: 
"The question here is that contradictions can be overcome only by 
means of struggle for this or that principle, for defining the goal of 
this or that struggle, for choosing this or that method of struggle that 
may lead to the goal. We can and we must come to agreement with 
those within the Party who differ with us on questions of current 
policy, on questions of a purely practical character. But if these ques-
tions involve differences over principle, then no agreement, no 'middle' 
line can save the cause. There is and there can be no 'middle' line on 
questions of principle. The work of the Party must be based either on 
these or those principles. The 'middle' line on questions of principle 
is a 'line' that muddles one's head, a 'line' that covers up differences, 
a 'line' of ideological degeneration of the Party, a 'line' of ideological 
death of the Party. It is not our policy to pursue such a 'middle' line. 
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It is the policy of a party that is declining and degenerating from day 
to day. Such a policy cannot but transform the party into an empty 
bureaucratic organ, standing isolated from the working people and 
becomiNg a puppet unable to do anything. Such a road cannot be our 
road." 
He added: "Our Party has been strengthened on the basis of over-
coming the contradictions within the Party."* 
. This explains the essential nature of inner-Party struggle. 
Much has already appeared in the works of Lenin and Stalin on 
the essential nature of inner-Party struggle and why liberalism and 
conciliationism in the Party are no good. You can read these and I will 
not say more here on this subject. 
The problem I now want to talk about is how to conduct inner-
Party struggle. To us this is still a new problem. At present everyone 
is studying this problem. This is absolutely essential. I do not at this 
time propose to speak on the problem comprehensively. I will merely 
present my views, based on my personal observations regarding the 
historical experiences of the Chinese Communist Party. I invite all 
comrades to disc'uss whether or not these views are correct. 
I 
THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH TIlE 
CIDNESE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS FOUNDED AND 
THE DEVIATIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN IN ITS 
INNER·P ARTY STRUGGLES 
WHAT DID 1tlarx and Engels do for the world proletariat? 
Marx and Engels provided the proletariat with a consolidated and 
complete ideological and theoretical system. Not only that, they also 
built an independent organization for the proletariat and led the mass 
struggles of the proletariat. They created the First International* and 
later was organized the Second International** as well as the Social-
Democratic parties and trade unions in the various European countries. 
They educated and showed the working class how to organize them-
selves and how to carryon struggles. 
During the period of the Second International (the period before 
the First World War), the Social-Democratic parties in the various 
countries carried on widespread organizational work among the work-
ers, extensively broadened the movement for organizing the working 
class, and attained enormous successes in the field of organization. 
Since this was the period of "peaceful" development of capitalism and 
the organizations of the working class were formed in such a period 
of peace, the distinction between the Party and the trade unions was 
not yet very clear. 
Especially after the death of Marx and Engels, the Second Interna-
tional, led by Kautsky and company, adopted an impermissible line 
of conciliation toward opportunism within the Party, with the result 
that opportunism corroded the various parties of the Second Interna-
tional. By the time of the imperialist era, the era of proletarian revo-
lution, these parties and trade unions revealed their inability to 
• International Workingmen.'s Association, founded September 28, 1864, in London, and gen-
erally referred to as the First International. Ii was dissolved in July, 1876.-Ed . 
•• Founded in Paris, on the hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution., July 14, 188~. 
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shoulder the revolutionary tasks which the proletariat ought to shoulder 
in the new period. Consequently, they could not but go bankrupt 
and decay in the course of the First World War. 
Lenin's era was different from that of Marx and Engels. It was 
an imperialist era, the era of moribund capitalism. It was the era of 
proletarian revolution. This period demanded that the proletariat 
build a strong, militant party, a party which was completely con-
solidated and united, ideologically, politically, organizationally and in 
action and which had close ties with the proletarian masses. Only 
by relying on such a party would it be possible to carryon successfully 
the extremely serious revolutionary struggles. Therefore, in addi-
tion to restoring and developing the doctrines of Marx and Engels 
in all their aspects, Lenin particularly created a complete doctrine 
concerning the establishment of proletarian revolutionary parties. 
The system of theories concerning the huilding-up of our Party was 
in the main created by Lenin. This doctrine on Party-building was 
absolutely inseparable from the strategy and tactics of leading the 
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. 
What were the conditions in the period when Lenin founded the 
revolutionary party of the proletariat? 
At that time, on the one hand, the imperialist war was approaching 
and the proletariat was confronted with the urgent task of overthrow-
ing the bourgeoisie, seizing state power, and establishing the dictator-
ship of the proletariat. On the other hand, the Social-Democratic 
parties of the Second International with their extensive organizations 
were not yet conscious of the need to overthrow the bourgeoisie and 
establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. They neither wanted nor 
dared to prepare for a revolutionary offensive by the proletariat. 
Therefore, the parties of the Second International were loosely or-
ganized and faction-ridden and could not conduct any serious struggle. 
As a result, they completely failed to meet the revolutionary demands 
of the proletariat at the time. 
The Social-Democratic parties of the various countries at that time 
not only fell theoretically and politically into the mire of Right op-
portunism (for instance, their theory of collaboration between labor 
and capital, their theory of the peaceful development of capitalism 
into socialism, their viewpoint that the proletariat could selze power 
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by parliamentary struggles without going through a revolution, ana 
that therefore there was no need for creating strategy and tactics of 
proletarian revolution, etc.), but they were also thoroughly Right op-
portunists on the question of party organization. The parties of the 
Second International and the Mensheviks* in Russia advocated liberal-
ism in Party organization. They advocated reducing the proletarian 
party to an ordinary workers' organization and held the view that 
no closely-welded organization or strict discipline was necessary in 
the Party. They advocated an unprincipled peace , within the Party 
and tolerated the existence of divergent ideological .and organizational 
factions within the Party and so on. To the parties of the Second 
International, party unity and discipline, self-criticism and struggle 
within the party were inconceivable and entirely unnecessary. Such 
were some of the principal concrete manifestations of Right oppor-
tunism of the parties of the Second International on the question of 
organization. 
At that time, there were also the Economists in Russia and the 
syndicalists in Europe (France, for example) who contended that 
the working class did not need a party organization, who refused 
to organize parties of the working class or subordinated the parties of 
the working class to the trade unions, who advocated "independence 
of the trade unions," and who denied the party's leadership in the 
trade unions. 
At that time, on the one hand, the militant tasks of the prole-
tarian revolution demanded that there should be a strong fighting 
party to lead the broad masses and to carry out such tasks. On the 
other hand, the parties of the Second International with their millions 
of party and trade union members, were utterly impotent and incapable 
of fighting. Moreover, their organizational backwardness and laxity 
were backed up by all kinds of opportunistic views about organization. 
These were the actual and important conditions when Lenin started to 
build the Bolshevik Party. 
Under the above-mentioned conditions, in order to build up a Party 
capable of leading the proletarian revolution, a Party which was com-
pletely united ideologically, politically and organizationally, Lenin 
.. A petty-bourgeois reformist, opportunist group in the Russian Social-Democratic Party. (See 
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chapter II. International Publishers, N. Y.) 
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could not but muster all forces to oppose the ideological and political 
opportunism of the parties of the Second International, particularly 
their opportunism on the question of party organization. It was on 
the question of organization-the conditions for joining the Party-
that differences first arose between Lenin's Bolshevik Party and the 
Mensheviks. 
Lenin's Bolshevik doctrine on party-building was worked out in 
the course of the struggle against Right opportunism regarding or-
ganization in the parties of the Second International, as well as dur-
ing the struggle against the theory of the Economists and syndicalists 
that working class political parties were unnecessary. Therefore, 
Lenin's doctrine on party-building was full of polemics against the 
various Right opportunist views on organization, against liberalism 
and conciliationism, against reducing the proletarian party to an or-
dinary workers' organization, against unprincipled peace within the 
Party, against factional organizations and activities inside the Party, 
and so forth. Lenin, in the fight against Right opportunism on the 
question of organization, definitely laid down that the Party is the 
most advanced, best organized and best disciplined detachment com-
posed of the most conscious, courageous and progressive elements of 
the proletariat and is the highest form of class organization of the pro-
letariat. The proletariat has, in addition to the Party, other organiza-
tions such as trade unions, cooperative societies, cultural and educa-
tional bodies, or even the government, army, etc. Yet of all these 
proletarian organizations, the Party is the highest form, capable of 
politically directing all other organizations. -
Thus, Lenin drew a definite line of demarcation between the Party 
and other organizations of the working class. Moreover, he laid down 
that the principle of Party organization should be democratic central-
ism, and that the Party should have a united, iron discipline. These 
principles of party organization were framed by Lenin in the course 
of struggle against Right opportunism of the parties of the Second 
Internationa,l on the question of organization. They constitute the 
the Party. That was decidedly the situation before the October Revo-
main content of Lenin's party-building doctrine. 
It was principally in the fight against Right, rather than "Left" 
opportunism with regard to party organization, that Lenin built up 
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lution. At that time "Left" opportunism regarding party organiza-
tion had either not yet come into being, or had not been fully de-
veloped into systematic opportunism. That explains why Lenin's 
party-building doctrine was filled with polemics against Right op-
portunism, that is, against abandoning strict organization and discip-
line, against unprincipled peace within the party, against denial of 
inner -Party struggle and fear of self-criticism, against liberalism and 
conciliationism inside the Party, against the theory of independence 
of trade unions, etc. These polemics resulted from the actual condi-
tions existing at the time when Lenin built the Party. 
But if we take note of the actual conditions under which the Com-
munist Party of China was built up, we will see that these conditions 
were entirely different from those which confronted Lenin before the 
October Revolution. 
First, the Chinese Party was built up after the October Revolution 
when the Russian Bolsheviks had already won victory and set a living 
example for us. That was why from the very beginning our Party 
was built in accordance with Lenin's principles and under the guid-
ance of the Communist International. 
Second, the Chinese Party, from its founding up to the present time, 
has never been influenced by the Second International of the Euro-
pean Social-Democratic parties, either ideologicaly or organizationally. 
Third, China, unlike Europe, has never witnessed a period of 
"peaceful" development of capitalism in which the working class was 
allowed to participate in peaceful parliamentary struggles. Nor did 
China have a labor aristocracy as was the case in Europe. 
Fourth, petty bourgeois elements and peasants made up a con-
siderable proportion of the Chinese Party's membership, which also 
included some idlers.* Herein lies the social b~sis of "Left" and Right 
opportunism inside the Chinese Party. 
Because of these four conditions we have subjectively followed 
Lenin's principles and path from the very beginning in building the 
Chinese Party. The majority of our Party members can recite from 
memory the organizational principles of the Bolshevik Party. Fur-
• Lumpen proletarians, that is, workers, peasants and other people, who have lost their jobs 
or their land as the result of the oppression and exploitation by the reactionary government 
or the landlord and compradore-capitalist classes, and who have resorted to improper methods 
as their main means of livelihood.-Ed. 
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thermore, the traditions and conventions of Social-Democracy have 
never existed in our Party. Thus, we have been able to walk along 
many straight paths. From the very inception of our Party we have 
conducted self-criticism and ideological struggle, laid down the sys-
tem of democratic centralism and maintained strict organization and 
discipline. We did not tolerate the existence of factions and we were 
violently opposed to liberalism, economism, and the independence of 
trade unions, etc. 'Therefore, -systematic Right opportunist theories 
on organization have never been openly advocated in our Party. Ideas 
that it is not necessary to have self-criticism, inner-Party struggle, strict 
organization and discipline, a working-class political party, or that 
trade unions should be completely independent, have had no chance 
to develop openly in our Party. 
The ideological struggle in our Party is still inadequate. However, 
this is not due to the existence within the Party of any systematic 
theory against inner-Party struggle. Rather, this is due to our in-
ability to discover divergences in matters of principle because of our 
low theoretical level or due to the fact that individual responsible 
comrades employed special methods to suppress self-criticism. 
But the special conditions and circumstances prevailing at the 
time when our Chinese Party was founded ga ve rise to two kinds 
of influences. One was favorable, enabling us from the very start 
to build a Communist Party of the Leninist type. Subjectively, we 
strictly adhered to the principles laid down by Lenin. From the 
very outset, our Party has carried out strict self-criticism and inner-
Party struggle. This accounted for the rapid progress of our Party 
and served as a motive force to spur our Party forward. 
But the other influence frequently led our comrades to another ex-
treme, to another kind of mistake-the mistake of carrying inner-Party 
struggles too far, of struggling too intensely without any restraints 
whatsoever. This resulted in another deviation, a "Left" deviation. 
Many comrades had a mechanical and erroneous understanding of 
Lenin's principles and turned them into absolute dogmas. They be-
lieved that the Party's highly centralized organization negates inner-
Party democracy, that the need for inner-Party struggle negates peace 
within the Party; that the political leadership of the Party-the highest 
form of class organization of the proletariat-in other mass organiza-
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tions of the proletariat negates the independence of trade unions and 
other organizations of the workers and toiling masses; and that unified, 
iron discipline means the obliteration of the individual personality, 
initiative and creativeness of Party members. 
Many comrades memorized the principles of Lenin as if they were 
dead things. While they considered inner-Party struggle to . be neces-
sary and regarded liberalism and conciliationism as useless, still they 
applied these principles mechanically and dogmatically. They thought 
that inner-Party struggles should and must be uncompromisingly car-
ried on regardless of the time, circumstances and issues involved, and 
that the more bitterly such struggles V\Tere conducted, the better. These 
comrades thought that the more vehement and sharp the form of inner-
Party struggle and criticism, the better. They felt that the sharper the 
controversies between Party comrades, the better. If this was not the 
case, then they thought that errors of liberalism and conciliationism 
were being committed. 
In order to prove that they themselves were free from liberal or 
conciliatory tendencies, that they were "100 per cent Bolsheviks," they 
carried on unprincipled struggles within the Party, irrespective of the 
actual conditions of time and place. Thus, these people became "row-
dies" without any standpoint in inner-Party struggles, "struggle 
specialists" with no regard for principle, or "brawl experts" given to 
fighting. They conducted struggle for the sake of struggle. This is 
disgraceful within the ranks of the proletariat. And of course it does 
not prove that they were "100 per cent Bolsheviks." On the contrary, 
it only serves to prove that they had insulted Bolshevism and utilized 
the name and appearance of Bolsheviks to practice opportunism inside 
the Party. 
Many comrades did not understand that our inner-Party struggle 
is a struggle over principle, a struggle for this or that principle, for 
defining the goal of this or that struggle, for choosing this or that 
method of struggle that may lead to the goal. 
These comrades did not understand that on questions of current 
policy, on questions of a purely practical character we can and must 
come to agreement with those within the Party who differ with us. 
They did not know or understand that on issues involving principle, 
on questions of defining the goal of our struggles and of choosing 
the methods of struggle needed to reach such goal they should wage 
an uncompromising struggle against those in the Party who hold 
divergent opinions; but on questions of current policy, on questions 
of a purely practical character, they should come to agreement with 
those within the Party who hold divergent opinions instead of carrying 
on an irreconciliable struggle against them, so long as such questions 
do not involve any difference over principle. 
This is precisely the traditional style of work in the Party of Lenin 
and Stalin, which, however, many of our comrades have not yet 
acquired. They conducted uncompromising struggles over issues on 
which they should have come to agreement. As a result, there was not 
a single issue they would not fight over, there was never a time when 
they would not fight and there was not a single person against whom 
they would not fight. They struggled against all who differed with 
them, enforcing absolute conformity. They made no concessions on 
anything and would not compromise under any circumstances. They 
regarded anything contrary as antagonistic and believed that opposi-
tion is everything. This constituted their absolutism. 
Many comrades did not understand what is principle, what prob-
lems involve principle and what are the Party's strategic and tactical 
lines. Nor did they know how to conduct a struggle by grasping the 
point of difference over principles, strategic plans and tactical lines. 
Their theoretical level was still exceedingly low and their political 
experience was limited. They were not yet able to grasp issues of great 
magnitude and fight over such issues. However, they rigidly commit-
tel to memory the fact that there must be inner-Party struggle and 
that it is wrong not to wage struggles. So even though they were unable 
to grasp the important issues and raise problems from the standpoint 
of the principles involved, nevertheless they still wanted to fight. Since 
they could only lay their hands on individual phenomena, on indi-
vidual problems, and since they carried on meaningless and unprin-
cipled struggles and controversies inside the Party against those who 
hold different views, · they therefore created among the comrades 
disunity, mutual antagonism and organizational splits. Such evil 
phenomena did exist in our inner-Party struggle. 
The above is one kind of deviation in the Chinese Party's inner-
Party struggles, an exceedingly grave deviation in the Chinese Party 
(although such deviations also exist in the parties of other countries). 
It constitutes inner-Party struggle carried on with too much intensity 
and without any restraint, which leads to another extreme-that of 
"Left" opportunism in inner-Party struggle, and "Left" opportunism 
on the question of party organization. (It negates democracy within 
the Party, negates inner-Party peace based on unity in matters of prin-
ciple, negates the relative independence of trade unions and other mass 
organizations, negates the personality, initiative and creativeness of 
Party members.) This deviation was caused by the special environment 
and conditions of the Chinese Party. 
Here I want to mention the fact that many Chinese comrades have 
not taken notice of Lenin's principled struggle against "Left" oppor-
tunism after the O'ctober Revolution, Following the October Revolu-
tion, a faction of "Left-Wing" Communists emerged within the Russian 
Party. This group opposed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty* and later 
there was the dispute on the trade union question. Before the October 
Revolution, there was a group of Otzovists** inside the Bolshevik 
Party with "Leftist" appearances but this group was quickly defeated 
and the situation did not become so serious as that caused by "Left-
Wing" Communism at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, 
although Lenin also defeated the latter before long. 
But "Left-Wing" Communism again emerged in the countries in 
W estern Europe. It raised the slogan of "no compromise," it opposed 
participation in parliaments. It opposed all legal struggles and neces-
sary alliances with the Left wing of the Social-Democratic parties. 
These were the circumstances under which Lenin wrote in April, 
1920, his book "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Dirorder*** to 
correct such trends. 
After the victory of the October Revolution those who previously 
did not believe that the proletariat could seize power were now faced 
with the living fact. This fact dealt a fatal blow to Right opportunism. 
It was under these conditions that "Left" opportunism was born, 
which contended that the revolution need not go along any circuitous 
paths but could gain victory overnight. 
• The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was signed on February 23, 1918, ending the state of war 
between. the young Soviet Republic and Germany and Austria . 
•• Otzovists or "recallists" pretended to conduct a militant fi~ht from the Left, demandina 
a boycott of the Tsarist Duma and recall of the Bolshevik deputIes . 
••• International Publishers, New York. 
Such sentiments also existed in the Chinese Party and at certain 
periods have even been the dominant sentiments. People committing 
such mistakes completely disregarded the importance of Lenin's book 
uLeft-WingU Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Politically, they were 
against making any zigzags and against waiting. They maintained 
that a vanguard minority could launch an adventurist offensive re-
gardless of the fact that the broad masses had not yet caught up with 
them. They accused others who opposed this of "Right opportunism." 
Right and "Left" opportunism on organizational questions results 
from Right and "Left" deviations on political questions. Since the 
Chinese Party has committed Right and "Left" political errors in cer-
tain periods, it has also committed these errors in organizational mat-
ters. Especially during the Civil War period, our "Left" adventurist 
errors were accountable for the excessively heated inner-Party struggles 
that took place on questions of organization. 
Consequently, there exist three kinds of deviations-if they can be 
classified in this manner-on the question of inner-Party struggle 
within the Chinese Party. The first is liberalism and conciliation ism 
within the Party; the second is mechanical and excessive inner-Party 
struggle and "Left" opportunism in organizational matters and in 
inner-Party struggle; the third is unprincipled disputes and struggles 
within the Party. 
These three kinds of deviations do not differ very much as far as 
their substance is concerned, because unprincipled disputes and strug-
gles, excessive struggles and liberalism within the Party are not Marxist-
Leninist. They are all manifestations of opposition to Marxism-Lenin-
ism. They are classified into the above three categories only by their 
outward forms. 
Such are the special conditions under which the Chinese Communist 




THE MAL~IFESTATIONS OF MECHANICAL AND 
EXCESSIVE INNER-PARTY STRUGGLE 
TODAY I AM NOT going to discuss the deviation of liberalism, which is 
the first of the aforementioned three kinds of deviations in inner-
Party struggle. Although I do not think that at present the deviation 
of liberalism inside the Party is not serious or that to fight liberalism 
is unimportant, although I do not believe that our comrades are 
thoroughly clear about the tendency of liberalism and its manifesta .. 
tions in various concrete problems,-rather I believe that many com-
rades are still not thoroughly clear-yet I am not going to speak on 
this subject today. I shall talk about it some other time when I have 
the chance. Here I merely want to point out that the tendency of 
liberalism inside the Party has somewhat developed recently and in 
many cases has become a principal tendency in inner-Party struggle 
and that ideological struggle inside the Party has not been sufficiently 
developed. For this reason, many erroneous tendencies and undesirable 
phenomena have not been effectively corrected in due time and Party 
discipline has gradually slackened. This is very bad. This is because 
our Party has recently taken in large numbers of intellectuals and new 
Party members who have been strongly imbued with the ideology of 
bourgeois liberalism, and who have not yet been steeled ideologically, 
politically or organizationally by the iron discipline of the proletariat. 
Meanwhile, many comrades who in the past committed "Left" mistakes 
and stood for excessive inner-Party struggle have now turned the other 
way round and committed the Right mistake of liberalism. In the 
circumstances of a long period of the united front, the possibility that 
the bourgeoisie would exercise influence within the Party has also 
increased. The covert counter-revolutionary elements in the Party 
have resorted to every means to develop and support liberalism inside 
the Party. As a result, the tendency of liberalism has developed in the 
Party. This tendency should be strongly opposed in our struggle to 
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strengthen our work in steeling the Party spirit. For example, some 
comrades kept silent about other comrades' mistakes for fear of reta-
liation. They would not point out the mistakes of their intimate friends 
in order to conceal each other's mistakes. They would not speak to 
one's face but would do a lot of irresponsible talk behind one's back. 
They indulged in irresponsible criticism, gave vent to their grumbles 
and engaged in gossiping, etc., such phenomena are quite prevalent 
inside the Party. 
Moreover, there has developed recently an especially serious pheno-
menon inside the Party. A certain group of persons fear that others 
would report their shortcomings and mistakes to the Party or to their 
superiors. They are terribly afraid lest others should bring up charges 
against them. On the one hand, they cannot help committing mistakes 
which they themselves know to be mistakes; they deliberately commit 
mistakes although they are aware of them. But on the other hand, they 
want to prevent other Party members from reporting their own 
mistakes to the Party or to their superiors and from criticizing them 
at the meetings. They have done some wrong and improper things 
and committed mistakes but they are unwilling to expose their mis-
takes in order to have their mistakes and shortcomings corrected. They 
conceal their sickness and are reluctant to have their sickness cured. 
They do not appreciate the truth that only by exposing their mistakes 
can such mistakes be corrected. They want to cover up such mistakes 
and hide them as if these mistakes were something more precious 
than any treasure on earth. For this reason, they not only try to forbid 
others to look squarely at their mistakes but also try to hold others' 
tongues and forbid others to report their mistakes to the Party or to 
their superiors, thus depriving others of the right to criticize and speak 
within the Party through absolutely proper organizational channels. 
They intimidate other comrades by saying, "if you dare to report to 
the superiors I will make you sorry. I will see that you are punished-
you sycophant." They hate vehemently those comrades who have re-
ported to the superiors and spoken about their mistakes. They take 
it to heart and think of retaliation. These phenomena are the evil 
indications of having lost completely the spirit of a Party member. 
They try to sever the connection between the leading bodies of the 
Party and the rank and file of the Party membership in order that 
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they may do mischief and evil inside the Party. Such phenomena 
should be strictly prohibited. 
When any Party member has seen other Party members commit 
mistakes or other things unfavorable to the Party, he must submit 
reports thereon to the Party and to their superiors. It is incorrect not 
to make such reports and it is entirely correct to make reports. To 
prevent others from reporting to the Party and to the superiors about 
one's mistakes is absolutely unlawful and will never be tolerated in 
the Party. Of course, the leading body of the Party upon receiving 
such reports should thoroughly look into the facts and carefully handle 
the case and should refrain from making any hasty judgment only 
on the basis of one-sided versions of the story. 
We have already decided that ideological struggle inside the Party 
should be properly set going. Therefore we must oppose liberalism. 
In certain Party organizations where particularly serious mistakes of 
liberalism have been committed, we should conduct, on the basis of 
facts, a concrete struggle against liberalism in order to overcome such 
mistakes. Several years ago, Comrade Mao T se-tung wrote an article 
against liberalism in which he enumerated eleven manifestations of 
liberalism inside the Party. His article still holds true to this day and 
you should carefully study it and try to correct and fight liberalism 
in accordance with this article. At the same time, liberalism will also 
be fully discussed in the course in Party building. This is why I don't 
want to deal with this subject today. What I am going to talk about 
is the second and third deviations because so far nobody has ever 
systematically discussed these two deviations within the Party. 
What are the manifestations of mechanical and excessive inner-Party 
struggle? 
First, in local Party organizations and in Party organizations in 
the army, the so-called "struggle meetings" are regularly held. Even 
in non-Party organizations such as government organs and mass or-
ganizations, "struggle meetings" are also regularly held. Such "strug-
gle meetings" are arranged in advance. They are not held for the 
main purpose of reviewing work. They are held for the purpose of 
attacking a certain person. Instead of conducting first of all a strug-
gle over the "points at issue," the struggle is directed "against the 
person." In other words, this struggle is not conducted mainly against 
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certain incorrect ideologies and principles, but against a certain per-
son. The purpose of the so-called "struggle against a certain Li or a 
certain Chang" is to deal a blow to a certain comrade who has com-
mitted mistakes. The "struggle meeting" is, in essence, a trial meet-
ing against a certain comrade. It is not aimed chiefly at solving 
problems ideologically but at solving certain problems organization-
ally. Its purpose is to drive into submission some trouble-makers or 
some comrades who dare to stick to their dissident opinions-such 
opinions are not necessarily wrong. Moreover, at every "struggle 
meeting," organizational conclusions are invariably drawn about the 
majority of the persons against whom the struggle has been waged. 
Quite obviously, such a form of struggle is not correct. 
Why is it not correct? 
First of all, the very term "struggle meeting" is incorrect. It makes 
no sense at all. Since there are so-called "struggle meetings," are there 
also any so-called "non-struggle meetings"? It will cause ideological 
confusion if we consider that there are certain meetings which are 
specifically devoted to conducting struggle and there are other meet-
ings at which there is no struggle at all. Here it proves that many 
comrades do not understand the absolute character and the universal 
character of the struggle. They mechanically divorce struggle from 
education. 
The aim of inner-Party struggle is to educate the Party and the 
comrades who have committed mistakes. Therefore, inner-Party 
struggle is in itself a kind of indispensable education within the Party. 
Education within the Party is also a kind of inner-Party struggle, a 
relatively mild struggle. Therefore, education and struggle cannot be 
viewed separately. Struggle is a kind of education and education is 
a kind of struggle. Any mechanical separation of the two is in-
correct. 
Furthermore, such "struggle meetings" are a concrete manifesta-
tion within the Party of sectarianism and of the erroneous policy of 
attacking cadres and comrades. They are aimed at attacking the 
comrades against whom the struggle is waged rather than helping, 
educating and rescuing the comrades who have committed mistakes. 
They are chiefly for the purpose of struggle against the person while 
divergence and antagonism in ideology are overlooked. Hence, such 
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"struggle meetings" often fail to really strengthen the unity within the 
Party ideologically, politically, organizationally and in action. On the 
contrary, they often deepen the differences over ideology, politics, 
organization and action inside the Party. They intensify the disunity 
and unprincipled disputes inside the Party. They help the growth 
of sectarianism inside the Party. It is all the more incorrect to hold 
such "struggle meetings" in non-Party organizations. 
Second, the mechanical and excessive inner-Party struggle also 
manifests itself in the following ways: some comrades hold the view 
that the more bitter the inner-Party struggle, the better . To them, 
the more seriously the problem is brought up, the better; the more 
fault-finding, the better; the more high-sounding terms used, the 
better; the more name-calling, the better; the sharper the criticism, 
the better; the more severe and the more rude the manner and the atti-
tude, the better; the louder the voice, the better; the longer the face, 
the better; the oftener the teeth are bared, the better. In acting in this 
way they regard themselves as "revolutionary as revolutionary could 
be." In inner-Party struggle and self-criticism, they pay no attention to 
appropriateness or moderation and do not stop at appropriate limits. 
They conduct the struggle without any restraint. Quite obviously, 
that is entirely incorrect. 
Third, some comrades still do not understand that inner-Party 
struggle is essentially an ideological struggle. Nor do they understand 
that only by achieving ideological unity can unity inside the Party 
be maintained and strengthened politically, organizationally and in 
action and that problems must be solved from the angle of ideology 
and principle before they can be solved from the angle of organiza-
tion and action. It is, however, no easy matter to achieve unity, to 
solve problems ideologically and on the basis of principles, to reform 
others' ideology and to correct others' long-held principles, viewpoints, 
and prejudices. This cannot be done simply in a few words or through 
a simple "struggle meeting." Nor can it be achieved simply by high-
handed means or compulsory measures. This can only be achieved 
through painstaking persuasion and education, through various kinds 
of complicated struggles and through a considerable period of edu-
cation, struggle and practice in revolution. Some comrades do not 
appreciate the essence of inner-Party struggle in this light. But, in-
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stead, they simplify, mechanize and vulgarize inner-Party struggle. 
They consider inner-Party struggle as a kind of contradiction in or-
ganization or in form, or they consider it as fighting, cursing, quar-
reling or wrestling. They do not look for real unity and do not solve 
problems on the basis of principle and ideology. They think that 
differences over ideology and principle within the Party can be 
settled by such simple, mechanical and vulgar methods. Quite ob-
viously, that is entirely incorrect. 
These comrades do not preserve or achieve unity within the Party 
by overcoming differences over principle and ideology within the Party 
and by correcting certain incorrect tendencies and phenomena. On 
the contrary, they attempt to preserve or achieve unity within the 
Party by simple organizational means or by high-handed measures, 
by a policy of attack, by a system of punishment in dealing with Party 
members. As a result, they bring about various erroneous and excessive 
inner-Party struggles. Therefore, instead of carefully and consider-
ately persuading comrades on the basis of principle and ideology, 
they suppress and bully comrades by resorting to simple organizational 
means, hostile methods and even administrative measures. They draw 
at random organizational conclusions about comrades and mete out 
organizational measures to discipline comrades. Moreover, they ruth- . 
lessly discipline comrades inside the Party from the bourgeois viewpoint 
of equality before the law-that is, they mete out the heaviest discipline 
as provided in the Party Constitution without taking into considera-
tion what kind of Party members the offenders are and whether or 
not the offenders have admitted or corrected their mistakes. In this 
way the system of disciplinary measures inside the Party is introduced. 
They often employ the means of conducting struggles in order to start 
and push forward work. They purposely look for "targets of struggle" 
(comrades inside the Party) and conduct the struggle against them 
as representatives of opportunism. They sacrifice and attack this one 
comrade or these few comrades, "killing the rooster to frighten the 
dog" as the Chinese saying goes, in order to make other Party cadres 
work hard and fulfill the task. They deliberately collect information 
about the shortcomings and mistakes of the target of $truggle and 
jot down mechanically and piecemeal his not too appropriat€ words and 
deeds. Then they view in isolation such shortcomings and mistakes 
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and his not too appropriate words and deeds and regard all these as 
representing the whole make-up of the comrade. They magnify the 
individual shortcomings and mistakes of this comrade and develop 
these into a system of opportunism, create an extremely unfavorahle 
impression about this comrade among comrades in the Party and in-
cite their hatred for opportunism in struggling against this comrade. 
Then, "everybody can inflict blows on a dead tiger." The psychology 
of revenge on the part of some persons begins to gain ground and 
they expose all the shortcomings and mistakes of this comrade and 
arbitrarily raise these shortcomings and mistak~s to the level of prin~ 
ciple. They even fabricate some story and on the basis of subjective 
suspicion and completely groundless rumors, accuse the comrade of 
various crimes. They will not stop until they drive him into mental 
confusion. With this done, they are still reluctant to allow the com-
rade who has been attacked to make any defense. If he makes any 
defense they would accuse him of deliberately defending his mistakes 
or of admitting mistakes with reservations. Then they would deal 
him further blows. They do not allow the comrade being attacked 
to reserve his opinions on condition of submission to the Party or-
ganization and do not allow him to appeal to the superiors but in-
sist upon his admitting his mistakes on the spot. In case the comrade 
being attacked has admitted all his mistakes, then they do not bother 
whether the problem pertaining to principle or ideology has been 
sol ved or not. So it occurred inside the Party that in the course of the 
struggle certain comrades admitted more mistakes than they had com-
mitted. In order to avoid attacks, they thought that they had better 
accept all the accusations. Although they admitted all the mistakes, 
as a matter of fact they still did not know what it was all about. This 
proves that such methods of struggle cannot cultivate the firmness 
of a communist in sticking to the truth. 
Fourth, the methods of struggle inside the Party are mixed up 
with the methods of struggle outside the Party. Some comrades 
mechanically apply the methods of inner-Party struggle to non-Party 
mass organizations and employ the methods of inner-Party struggle 
in conducting struggles against non-Party cadres and the masses. On 
the other hand, some comrades employ the methods of struggle out-
side the Party and the methods of struggle against the enemy and 
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against alien elements in conducting struggle against comrades inside 
the Party. They adopt measures used in dealing with the enemy and 
alien elements when dealing with comrades inside the Party. They 
employ all kinds of provocations and maneuvers. They apply all kinds 
of administrative measures such as surveillance, charges, hearings, 
expulsions, etc., in inner-Party struggle. For example, the "Left" 
mistake committed by some comrades in the hunting down of traitors 
is largely due to the fact that they have not drawn a strict line between 
the struggle inside the Party and the struggle outside the Party and 
that they have mixed up the ideological struggle inside the Party with 
the campaign to hunt down traitors. Often there are enemy spies 
hiding inside the Party. But we must rely upon facts in conducting 
struggle against these hidden spies, expose them and expel them from 
the Party. But that is entirely different from the struggle waged for 
the purpose of educating Party members who have committed mis-
takes. A clear line of demarcation ought to be drawn between these 
two. The struggle inside the Party and the struggle outside the 
Party are closely related but their respective methods and forms of 
struggle must differ. 
There are still some comrades (in fact, they can no longer be called 
comrades) who ope1}ly rely upon and make use of the forces outside 
the Party to conduct inner-Party struggle and to blackmail and in-
timidate the Party. For instance, relying upon their partial achieve-
ments, their troops and rifles, their prestige among the masses and 
their relations with a certain section of the United Front, some peo-
ple conduct a struggle against the Party and the higher organiza-
tions. They compel the higher organization and the Party to accept 
their demands and opinions. They adopt an independent attitude 
toward the Party and declare their independence of the Party. Or 
they take advantage of the newspapers, magazines and various con-
ferences outside the Party and even those of the bourgeoisie and the 
enemy to conduct a struggle against the higher Party organizations 
and certain comrades and cadres. Quite obviously, this is a mistake 
which is as serious as that of another group of persons who, relying 
upon the influence of the Party, coerce, command and oppress the 
masses and blackmail and impose exactions upon persons outside the 
Party. These persons conduct struggles against the Party from a non-
Party standpoint. Therefore, although they are Communists in 
name, they have completely departed from the standpoint of the Party 
and have become enemies of the Party. 
Fifth, many problems in our Party are settled at meetings or through 
meetings. This is good. But in various organizations many meet-
ings are held without preparation or previous investigation and study. 
Thus many divergent opinions are expressed and disputes often 
take place in the course of the meetings. Inasmuch as the conclu-
sions of all meetings are invariably made by the leading partici-
pants and the conclusions made at such meetings are equivalent to 
~ecisions, many defects often occur. I have noticed that controversies 
at some meetings eventually awaited decision by the instructor or the 
secretary of a Party branch or some other responsible comrade. But 
the responsible comrade himself was not sure at all and he was en-
tirely unclear about the question. But since the problem was so press-
ing, he had to come to a conclusion anyway; otherwise he could not 
be a responsible comrade any longer. This responsible comrade had to 
make a decision and in some cases he was greatly embarrassed and 
sweated all over. He rashly made up his mind and his conclusion 
amounted to a decision. Things were decided in accordance with this 
conclusion and of course many mistakes were bound to happen. Some 
comrades, when they do not feel sure enough to make a decision 
about a problem, are not willing to say that they are not sure and that 
they need time to consider and study the problem or to refer the prob-
lem to the higher authorities. However, they pretend that they them-
selves are already sure in order to save face and maintain their posi-
tions. They casually make a decision which often turns out to be in-
correct. Such things should also be corrected. 
In dealing with a11 problems, all of our comrades should assume 
the attitude: "If you know a thing, just say you know it; if you do 
not know, say so," and should not "claim to know what one really 
does not know." The problems insiae the Party cannot be settled 
in an arbitrary manner. All meetings should reach conclusions. But 
matters which cannot be decided or problems which are still doubtful 
or have not yet been cleared up should not be decided casually. Mat-
ters decided must be matters about which one feels quite sure. Mat-
ters of which one is not sure may be reserved for further considera-
tion or may be referred to the higher authorities. The conclusion at a 
meeting may not necessarily be made by the most responsihle com-
rade who attends the meeting. Whoever makes the report may make 
the conclusion after discussion. But the conclusion made by this com-
rade may not necessarily be equivalent to a decision. The decision made 
at the meeting may be different from the conclusion made by this 
comrade. This is also the case with the style of work in the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union. 
The above are some important manifestations of mechanical and 
excessive inner-Party struggle. 
What I have mentioned above are of course some examples of the 
worst type. That does not mean that our present and past inner-
Party struggle is universally so. But such forms of inner-Party struggle 
are actually in existence and in a certain period they occupied a domi-
nant position and became the main form of inner-Party struggle. 
What results have these incorrect and inappropriate forms of inner-
Party struggle produced inside the Party? They have produced the 
following bad results: 
First, they have given encouragement to the patriarchy inside the 
Party. Under such forms of inner-Party struggle, individual "leaders 
and leading bodies oppress many Party members to such an extent that 
the latter dare not speak up or criticize, thus leading to the arbitrary 
manner of an individual or a few persons inside the Party. 
Second, they have given encouragement to the tendency of ultra-
democracy and the development of liberalism inside the Party. Many 
Party members in ordinary times dare not speak up or criticize and, 
superficially, peace and unity prevail inside the Party. But when the 
contradictions can no longer be concealed and when the situation 
has become serious and mistakes are exposed, then they begin to en-
gage in wild criticism and struggle, resulting in antagonism, splits and 
organizational chaos inside the Party which are almost beyond remedy. 
This is the opposite side of patriarchy inside the Party. 
Third, they have prevented the correct establishment of Party life 
based on democratic centralism with the result that democratic life 
inside the Party is irregular, abnormal or extremely lacking. 
Fourth, they have impeded the development of Party members' 
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enthusiasm, initiative and creative power and weakened their sense 
of responsibility toward the Party and their work, with the result 
that some comrades dare not assume responsibility with enthusiasm, 
or work or create with a free hand. They have led comrades not to 
bother to consider and study problems and situations carefully but 
have encouraged their working style of attending to their work per 
functorily and merely echoing others' words. 
Fifth, they have helped the development of sectarianism and un-
principled factional struggle inside the Party. They have given rise 
to the psychology of fearing criticism and struggle inside the Party 
and cultivated the conservative psychology of "minding one's own 
business" among some comrades, the psychology of "the less work, the 
better." 
Sixth, they have afforded more opportunities for the Trotskyite 
spies and counter-revolutionary elements to undermine our Party and 
have furnished more pretexts for counter-revolution to attack our Party. 
The Trotskyite spies particularly take advantage of contradictions in-
side the Party and any not too correct inner-Party struggles to carry 
on their activity of undermining the Party and to win over those ele-
ments who have been attacked and who are dissatisfied with the Party. 
The counter-revolution takes advantage of the struggle against op-
portunism to conduct propaganda and provocation, and to influence 
sympathizers outside the Party and unreliable elements inside the 
Party in order to carry out a policy of estrangement and to under-
mine the solidarity and unity inside the Party. 
The above-mentioned bad results have occurred inside the Party 
and some of them still remain to be eliminated. 
Such mechanical and excessive forms of inner-Party struggle have 
created abnormal conditions in Party life for a considerable length of 
time and have caused great losses to the Party. Although they have 
been corrected in the higher leading bodies of our Party and have 
ceased to be dominant forms of struggle at present in the Party as a 
whole, yet in certain organizations at the middle and lower levels 
and in certain individual organizations, these forms of struggle have 
not yet been corrected and have continued to exist quite prevalently 
in varying degrees. As a result life in these organizations in still ah- . 
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normal. Therefore, we must call serious attention to this deviation 
so that we may thoroughly eliminate it from our organization and 
so that our comrades may not repeat these mistakes and may correctly 
and steadily conduct the ideological struggle inside the Party and 
push the Party forward. 
III 
UNPRINCIPLED STRUGGLE WITHIN THE PARTY 
Now I AM going to discuss another deviation in inner-Party struggles 
-the unprincipled struggle within the Party. Such a particular and 
serious phenomenon prevails in the Chinese Party. Although there ex-
ists a so-called "idle-gossip tendency" in the parties of foreign coun-
tries, I do not think the situation is so serious as it is in the Chinese 
Party. We must make our comrades fully aware of such a phenomenon 
and take the necessary steps to cope with it; otherwise the hindrance 
to the Party's unity and work will be too great. 
What are unprincipled disputes and unprincipled struggles within 
the Party? 
I hold the view that the following disputes and struggles are unprin-
cipled, that is, they constitute a departure from the common position 
and principles representing the revolutionary interests of our Party and 
of the proletariat. 
First, some comrades do not raise questions or conduct a struggle 
against other comrades from the position of the Party or on the basis 
of the interests of the whole Party, but raise questions and conduct 
struggles against other comrades within the Party from the standpoint 
of their personal interests or clique interests. That is to say, their posi-
tion in conducting inner-Party struggles is not correct. Therefore, 
their viewpoints, policies and methods in relation to questions are not 
correct either. They favor or advocate any measures so long as such 
measures are beneficial to themselves or to a few people. They oppose 
or reject any measures that are not beneficial to themselves or to the 
few. Whether or not such measures are beneficial to the Party or to 
the revolution they do not care, or else they push such measures aside 
as a matter of secondary importance. So what these people oppose or 
advocate is entirely unprincipled, a departure from the principles of the 
Party and the revolution. In other words, their principle is not the 
principle of the Party and the revolution, but the principle of their per-
sonal interests. Should every one take his own interests as his prin-
ciple, then his principle and interests would certainly conflict with those 
of others and they would be bound to struggle against one another. 
For instance, some of you quarreled or struggled with each other 
about orderlies, horses, food, clothing, medical treatment, promotion, 
etc. Such questions fall into the category of personal and unprin-
cipled questions. Comrades do not suggest general principles as to 
how orderlies, horses, food, clothing and medical treatment should 
be distributed so that the Party may benefit and do not ask the Party or 
the school to adopt these principles, but raise questions such as: Why 
don't they give me an orderly or a horse? Why don't they give me 
medical treatment? Why don't they promote me? Why don't they 
give me good food and clothing? Everything is centered on "me" 
and everything proceeds from the position of "me" and in such a 
manner disputes are created and struggles are carried on within the 
Party. Therefore, as long as they personally are satisfied, even if 
things are otherwise unreasonably arranged, they care not a whit. 
This is one kind of unprincipled struggle. 
Let us take another example, some comrades are opposed to ex-
travagance. Some comrades oppose extravagance from the standpoint 
of the interests of the Party or from the position of the Party. They 
point out instances of extravagance which violate the principle of 
austerity and criticize and oppose them. They also submit proposals 
regarding economy and ask the Party to adopt them. This is correct. 
But there are other comrades who do not oppose extravagance 
from the standpoint of the interests of the Party or from the position 
of the Party. They raise such questions as: Some have squandered 
so much money, some have had such good food, some have had 
such good clothing, some have. . . . Well, why shouldn't I eat like 
that, spend money like that, and have clothing like that? Is it because 
I am not old enough a veteran or is it because I have rendered no 
service to the Party? So he stands up and fights under the slogan of 
anti-extravagance. The reason is simply that he has not yet had a 
chance to squander like others. This is also a kind of unprincipled 
struggle. 
Take another example. In East Anhwei, government personnel 
were given a small salary.· So some comrades asked to be sent to 
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work in the government organizations, with the aim that they might 
get a salary. When they were not allowed to go they launched a 
struggle under the slogan of opposing government personnel having 
salaries. Furthermore they did not make any suggestions in prin-
ciple as to how the living allowances of government personnel should 
be fixed and then discuss them. This is also a kind of unprincipled 
struggle. 
Second, some comrades stir up disputes and conduct struggles 
within the Party not for the purpose of making Party affairs better, 
but for the purpose of making them worse, or for ulterior purposes. 
Such purposes are incorrect. It is also a kind of unprincipled strug-
gle. For instance, in order to cut a figure, to maintain personal 
position, to save face, or even to revenge themselves against others, 
some comrades, disregarding the situation and conditions at the time, 
arouse disputes and conduct struggles against other comrades within 
the Party, disrupting their work and plans, and undermining order 
and unity in the Party. This also belongs to this category of un-
principled struggle. 
Third, some comrades do not raise questions on the basis of prin-
ciple, asking the Party to adopt or to give up something, but bring 
up questions and conduct struggles on the basis of personal senti-
ment, pleasure or displeasure. They curse and get mad at people be-
cause they want to have a momentary fit of gratification and give 
vent to their ill feelings and grudges. This is also a kind of unprin-
cipled struggle. There are some other comrades who, due to their 
limited experience and their low theoretical level are unable to raise 
questions and argue on the basis of principle. They engage in abso-
lutely irreconcilable disputes with other comrades over issues which 
are of an isolated, piecemeal and purely practical nature, issues of 
current policy having nothing to do with principle, instead of over 
issues involving general principle. Therefore, this is also a kind of 
unprincipled struggle which should not be insisted upon. 
F or example, some comrades hold differing views with regard 
to certain battles, certain actions, certain forms of struggle or certain 
methods of organization. They stick to their own views and argue 
• At the time of the Anti-Japanese War government personnel in the Liberated Areas were 
provided with all daily necessities. Except for some pocket money, they received no salaries.-Ed. 
endlessly without touching the general principle of tactics and strate-
gic planning, the general policy of action and the form of struggle 
and of organization in general, etc. Their questions are incorrectly 
brought up, so usually no correct conclusion can be drawn, or any 
of the differing views could be correct, and fruitless, idle talk is often 
the result. 
Fourth, inner-Party struggle is conducted by fair means or foul 
without going through the prescribed organizational procedure. In-
stances are: To win over or attack comrades in an unprincipled way 
inside the Party; to stir up trouble and cause dissension among the 
comrades; to plan conspiracies against and set traps for other com-
rades; to say nothing in one's presence, but indulge in backbiting; to 
make irresponsible criticisms against the Party; to gossip; to devote 
oneself to rumor-mongering; to tell lies and to spread libels against 
other comrades, etc. 
The struggles mentioned above are unprincipled struggles. Be-
sides, there are some comrades who mix into principled struggle cer-
tain elements of unprincipled struggle or carryon unprincipled strug-
gles under the banner of principled struggles. There are others who 
are particularly interested in the dispute between a certain person 
and another, and in the abnormal relationship between one and an-
other, but who are not interested in the sum and substance of their 
quarrel. 
All such unprincipled struggles within the Party are not -good and 
they are detrimental to the Party. 
Comrades may ask: What is principle? What are the questions of a 
purely practical character which have nothing to do with principle? 
What are the questions of current policy? Why on these questions 
should I not stick to my views and why should I compromise in every 
way with other people who differ with me? 
These are questions that really should be straightened out. 
What is principle? 
Viewed purely from the angle of theory, what is meant by prin-
ciple is the general laws governing the development of things. Particu-
lar things are governed by particular laws of development. Similar 
things are governed on the whole by similar laws of development. 
What we mean by the question of principle is a question of method 
which we use in viewing and handling problems in accordance with 
the general laws governing the development of things. If our general 
laws governing the observation and handling of problems are wrong, 
if our position, standpoint and method are wrong, errors will cer-
tainly occur in our observation of and dealing with questions. If we 
understand wrongly the laws governing the development of certain 
problems then the method with which we handle such problems will 
certainly be wrong. Therefore, we should not treat a question of 
principle lightly. If errors occur in principle, then not only individ-
ual errors, but also errors of a systematic and persistent nature, af-
fecting a series of practical problems, will occur. 
What are the problems of current policy which have nothing to do 
with principle, and what are the problems of a purely practical char-
acter? 
Most of these problems are individual problems, problems of daily 
routine and daily life. For instance, to mobilize and organize the 
masses is a problem of principle, and on this we all agree. The task 
of mobilizing and organizing the masses must be concentrated and 
led by mass organizations and the Army should also help and take 
part in such a task. All these are questions of principle on which we 
all agree. That is to say we hold no different opinions with regard to 
principle. But some of our comrades are of the opinion that the civil 
transportation corps and the civil transportation department of the 
Army should be suspended temporarily and the personnel should be 
dispatched to work in mass organizations. Some other comrades hold 
that the civil transportation corps should not be suspended. Some 
comrades suggest that a mass organization should be divided into 
four departments, while others suggest it be divided into five depart-
ments. All these problems are problems of a purely practical character. 
None of them are problems of principle. 
As another example, at present the general principle of strategy 
of our war of resistance behind the enemy lines is a strategy of dis-
persed guerrilla warfare. In case there are no divergent views among 
us regarding this point, it means we have no divergent views regarding 
the principle of strategy. Suppose there is a certain commander 
who, forced by circumstances, or because of a particularly advantageous 
circumstance, fights a battle of mobile warfare resulting in either 
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victory or defeat. This is an individual practical problem which has 
nothing to do with the question of principle. Even if one or two of 
these battles are mistakes, these mistakes are still individual mistakes, 
so long as the commander does not hold it as a principle to wage mobile 
warfare behind the enemy lines. Perhaps owing to a specific situation 
he may even fight a not too bad battle. Therefore, we should not per-
sist in our own views and endlessly argue over such individual, 
purely practical questions. 
As another example, our Army, equipped as it is today, should 
not in principle attack the strong positions and the maj or cities of the 
enemy. If we have no divergent views on this principle, then it would 
be an individual practical question, having nothing to do with prin-
ciple, should we, in a special situation, or because of a special neces-
sity, launch an offensive and take a certain enemy position or city. 
However, if you say that since we have taken this stronghold or 
that city, we may launch attacks right away on all enemy strongholds 
and cities, there the question of principle arises. During the civil war 
period, some comrades advocated attacks on big cities and directed 
the Red Army to attack certain major cities. It was a practical prob-
lem which concerned principle, because their attacks on big cities 
were motivated by their advocacy that in principle the Red Army 
should attack big cities. On such a practical problem which involved 
principle, we should not make a compromise regarding principle. We 
should still advocate in principle that no attacks on big cities should be 
launched. 
There are often several solutions for concrete and practical prob-
lems. There are often several actually possible roads to take from one 
place to another. These ways and roads have their respective merits 
and demerits so far as the situations confronting us at the time are 
concerned. Some ways and roads are the most advantageous to us 
but they are risky, so, to play safe, we had better take the less ad-
vantageous ways and roads. 
Therefore, if divergent views occur over such concrete and purely 
practical issues, so long as these views do not involve principle, we 
should try our best to compromise, to make concessions, to accept 
and subscribe to others' views. "Be good at compromising," then 
matters can be smoothly dealt with, and questions promptly settled. 
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We should not always persist in our views, always ask others to give up 
their views, to acquiesce, and to deal with matters in accordance 
with our views. If so, we would only delay the settlement of issues, 
obstruct the progress of work, sharpen the disputes and strengthen 
the tendency to idle talk in the Party, and obstruct unity among the 
comrades. That is why we should make all possible compromises 
with Party members holding different views concerning questions 
of a purely practical character. 
Now we know. what are questions of current policy which have 
nothing to do with principle and what are questions of a purely 
practical character. They are questions which have nothing to do 
with the objective of struggle and the form of struggle with which to 
attain the objective, which do not involve strategy and tactics, which 
have no concern with our general position and our position in rela-
tion to specific issues. The foregoing examples are questions of this 
kind. 
To sum up, our general guiding principle in dealing with all issues 
is in the interests of the struggle of the Party and the proletariat. 
Everything must be subordinaed to this general principle. All stand-
points, opinions and' actions against this g~neral principle must be 
opposed. The various principles are divided into big principles and 
small principles. The law is that the part is ' subordinated to the 
whole, the immediate interests to the long-range interests, the small 
principles to the big principles. No conciliation or compromise can 
be made in regard to differences over principle. We must thrash out 
the questions in order to reach agreement. However, on all issues 
which have nothing to do with principle we should not be doggedly 
uncompromising and we should not struggle and argue too em-
phatically, otherwise our work would be impeded and unity im-
paired. 
I once heard a comrade say that as long as his political stand in 
inner-Party struggle was "correct" it would not matter, or it was of 
secondary importance, if he committed some organizational mistakes. 
So he held that in inner-Party struggle it was permissible to struggle 
against his opponents by various means incompatible with organiza-
tienal discipline. Such an argument and viewpoint were obviously in-
correct, because he regarded the correct political line and the correct 
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organizational line as things contradicting each other. He did not 
know that to disrupt the order and organization within the Party is 
to commit the gravest error in principle. It is particularly so today. 
To impair the unity and solidarity within the Party is to best help the 
enemy, to most severely damage the interests of the Party and the 
proletariat, and to commit an error which is more serious than any 
other error committed in principle. 
On this point, as well as on many other questions of principle, all 
our comrades should try their best to compare and to differentiate the 
various questions of principle in relation to the degree of their in-
fluence upon the interests of the party at the time. In accordance with 
the law that the small principles should be subordinated to the big 
principles, the part to the whole, we will decide on what questions of 
principle we should not persist and should make temporary conces-
sions and on what questions of principle we should persist and make 
no concessions. 
To uphold inner-Party solidarity and unity we should sometimes 
make a temporary compromise with other people within the Party 
who hold divergent views regarding certain questions of principle 
which are relatively not so important or so urgent; we should not bring 
up such questions of principle for the time being, and argue per-
sistently over them. Instead, we should lay our emphasis upon the 
urgent questions which are of great consequence at the time. Of course, 
this is by no means a compromise in principle and a middle line, but 
is a compromise in actual action and is a submission to majority de-
CISIon. 
The foregoing are questions of unprincipled struggle within the 
Party. 
Where do the inner-Party unprincipled struggle and the mechanical, 
excessive struggle come from? What are their origins? They originate 
from the following: 
First, the theoretical level of our comrades within the Party is in 
general very low and their experiences in many respects are not yet 
sufficient. For a long time the leadership and centre of the whole Party 
did not actually come into being, while up to now in different localities 
very few leaderships and centres of the Party have actually come into 
being. 
Second, there are many petty-bourgeois elements in the Party. The 
impetuousness, the frenzy of the petty-bourgeoisie, the vengefulness 
of the peasant petty-bourgeoisie constantly influenced inner-Party 
struggles. 
Third, the democratic life within the Party is abnormal. The style 
of discussing questions mutually and objectively among the comrades 
has not yet been established. The sty Ie of judging and dealing with 
questions rudely and subjectively still exists to a serious extent. 
Fourth, opportunists have smuggled themselves into the Party and 
certain opportunistic psychology exists in the minds of part of our 
comrades. To show how well they have been "bolshevized," they 
often try deliberately to be "Left," thinking that "Left" is better than 
Right. Or they attack others so as to raise their own prestige. 
Fifth, Trotskyite traitors and counter-revolutionary elements have 
smuggled themselves into the Party, and they seek to undermine the 
Party by taking advantage of inner-Party struggle. These treacherous 
Trotskyites often, under the cover of the Party banner, deliberately 
~ttack certain comrades. After that, one of the treacherous Trotskyites 
would be sent to contact the comrade being attacked, trying to draw 
him into their gang as aspy. 
Such are the origins of the various deviations in inner-Party strug-
gle. 
From the very beginning our Party has had severe self-criticism and 
inner-Party struggles. This is entirely necessary and very good. In 
our inner-Party struggle a great deal has been correctly and appro-
priately carried out. Therefore, our Party has in many cases made 
achievements in inner-Party struggles and has to some extent raised 
the theoretical level of our Party. There is no denying that these 
criticisms and inner-Party struggles are the force which pushes our 
Party forward on the road of progress. Our Party cannot do without 
them. Nor can we deny that in the long historical development of 
our Party, in our inner-Party struggle of the past, there existed the 
aforementioned typical deviations and errors, and in many cases inner-
Party struggle was not conducted in a correct manner. As a result, 
we paid dearly for our inner-Party struggles. Therefore, what we 
should do today is to profit by past errors, to see to it that we have 
not paid high prices in vain) and to seek a great progress of the Party 
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by studying the historical lessons of the inner-Party struggles of the 
past. 
To obtain greater achievements in inner-Party struggle and to 
achieve greater progress of the Party at less cost and pain-that is the 
policy for the present and future inner-Party struggle, which we 
should lay down by studying the historical lessons of the inner-Party 
struggle of the Chinese Party. For this purpose, it is necessary that 
we thoroughly set right the various deviations and mistakes in past 
inner-Party struggles, and that we conduct inner-Party struggles ef-
fectively and properly. 
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IV 
HOW TO CONDUCT INNER·PARTY STRUGGLE 
THE QUESTION is clear-how to conduct inner-Party struggle correctly 
and appropriately. 
On this question, the Communist parties of the U.S.S.R. and many 
other countries have much experience and so has the Chinese Party. 
Lenin and Stalin have taught us, and the Central Committee of our 
Party has issued many instructions on this. Our comrades must make 
a careful study of these experiences and instructions, which will also 
be discussed when we come to the question of Party-building. Today 
I will not touch upon them. I will bring up for the reference of our 
comrades only the following points, on the basis of the experience of 
the inner-Party struggle of the Chinese Party. 
First of all, comrades must understand that inner-Party struggle is 
a matter of the greatest seriousness and responsibility. We must con-
duct it with the strictest and most responsible attitude and should 
never conduct it carelessly. In carrying out inner-Party struggle we 
must first fully adopt the correct stand of the Party, the unselfish stand 
of serving the interests of the Party, of doing better work, and of help-
ing other comrades to correct their mistakes and to gain a better un-
derstanding of the problems. We ourselves must be clear about the 
facts and prohlems by making a systematic investigation and study. 
At the same time, we must carryon systematic, well-prepared and 
well-led inner-Party struggles. 
A comrade must understand that only by first taking the correct 
stand himself can one rectify the incorrect stand of others. Only by 
behaving properly oneself can one correct the misbehavior of others. 
The old saying has it: "One must first correct oneself before one can 
correct others." 
Only when one does not vacillate himself, can one help the vacil-
lating elements to overcome their vacillations. 
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Only when one is armed himself with correct principles and theories, 
can one overcome the incorrect principles and theories of others. 
Only when one has a clear understanding himself of the question 
of principle, can one help to clear up confusion of others. Only when 
one has himself collected much actual data on specific problems and 
studied more systematically such problems can one be of much help 
to other comrades and to the Party. 
If a comrade does not do this, if he himself in the first place does 
not adopt the correct position and has not mastered the correct prin-
ciples, if he has not viewed the objective situation according to prin-
ciples, or has not systematically studied the problems, or even if he 
has some particular shortcomings and is not clear enough himself 
about certain points, he will not be able to overcome what is incorrect 
in others, in the course of the inner-Party struggle. If in spite of all 
this he persists in carrying on the struggle in a headstrong fashion he 
will in all probability end up in the wrong way. 
Only objective hard facts, only experiences tested in practice and 
only truth can triumph over all. 
Our self-criticism and inner-Party struggle are not intended to 
weaken the Party's organization, solidarity, discipline and prestige or 
to obstruct the progress of its work. On the contrary, they are intended 
to strengthen our Party's organization and solidarity, enhance its 
discipline and prestige, and accelerate the progress of its work. Thus, 
inner-Party struggle must not be allowed to follow a course that leads 
to undisciplined individualism in the name of democracy. Inside the 
Party, neither patriarchy nor irresponsible excesses that in practice 
abuse democracy is allowed. These are the two extremes of abnormal 
life within the Party. 
Inner-Party struggle must be conducted with the greatest sense of 
responsibility to the Party and to the revolution. 
Second, comrades must understand that inner-Party struggle is 
basically a struggle between different ideologies and principles inside 
the Party. It represents antagonism between different ideologies and 
principles inside the Party. It is imperatively necessary to draw a clear 
line with regard to ideology and principle. But with regard to organ-
ization, the form of struggle, the manner of speaking and criticizing, 
comrades must be as little antagonistic as possible, must try their best 
to discuss or to argue over matters in a calm way, and must try their 
best not to adopt organizational measures and not to draw organiza-
tional conclusions. 
In conducting inner-Party struggle comrades must try their best to 
assume a sincere, frank and positive educational attitude in order to 
achieve unity in ideology and principle. Only in cases where we have 
no alternative, when it is deemed imperative, may we adopt militant 
forms of struggle and apply organizational measures. All Party organ-
izations, within appropriate limits, have full right to draw organiza-
tional conclusions in regard to any Party member who persists in his 
errors. The application of Party disciplinary measures and the adoption 
of organizational measures are entirely necessary under certain cir-
cumstances. Such measures, however, cannot be used casually or in-
discriminately. Party discipline cannot be upheld simply by the exces-
sive punishment of comrades hy Party organizations. The upholding 
of Party discipline and Party unity does not in the main depend on 
the punishment of comrades, (if they have to be upheld in such a 
manner it signifies a crisis in the Party), but rather on the actual unity 
of the Party in ideology and principle, and on the consciousness of 
the vast majority of the Party members. When we are eventually fully 
clear regarding ideology and principle, it is very easy for us to draw 
organizational conclusions, if necessary. It does not take us a minute 
to expel Party members or announce voluntary withdrawal from the 
Party. 
With regard to different ideologies and principles, comrades' 
persistence, opposition and arguments cannot be separated from their 
obedience to the Party organization, to the majority and to the higher 
authority, otherwise, there would be no Party unity and no unity in 
action. Comrades should never, because of their insistence on principle, 
oppose the Party organizationally, disobey the majority and the higher 
authority and begin to take independent action. Such would constitute 
a violation of the fundamental discipline of the Party. 
What we should adopt as the correct method in conducting inner-
Party struggle is this: Militancy in the fight over principles and 
ideologies and the least possible militancy with regard to organization 
and forms of struggle. Many comrades committed mistakes because 
on the one hand there was no fight or clear-cut difference with regard 
to ideologies and principles, but on the other hand, there was excessive 
fighting with regard to organization and forms of struggle. They 
argued so much that their faces became red, they cursed so much 
that they called each other all kinds of names and they fought so much 
that they avoided meeting each other. Profound hatred developed 
among them. But strangely enough, no clear-cut differences over prin-
ciple or ideology were found among them. 
Third, criticisms directed against Party organizations or against 
comrades and their work must be appropriate and well-regulated. 
Bolshevik self-criticism is conducted according to the Bolshevik yard-
stick. Excessive criticism, the exaggeration of others' errors and indis-
criminate name-calling are all incorrect. The case is not that the more 
bitter the inner-Party struggle, the better; but that inner-Party struggle 
should be conducted within proper limits and that appropriateness 
should be observed. Both over-shooting the target or falling short of 
it are undesirable. 
In pointing out or criticizing the errors of others, comrades must 
grasp the key points and stress the most important issues. Comrades 
must explain problems to others in a systematic way and with clarity 
so that problems may be solved. Comrades should not pile up piece-
meal various errors of others and many seemingly-true facts, and 
simply expose them. This will make people think that you are deliber-
ately finding fault with them, attacking them, a~d dealing them blows. 
When you are appraising and criticizing a certain comrade, you 
should not only point out his shortcomings and errors as if they were 
everything about him but should also give credit for his accomplish-
ments, meritorious services, good points and those of his views which 
are correct. Even if only a part or even only a tiny part of his opinion 
is correct, you should point it out for him and not leave it unmen-
tioned. Only in so doing, can you make a full appraisal and criticism 
of him, help him improve himself and convince him. 
This is the method which we should adopt in inner-Party struggles; 
appropriate criticism, appropriate attitude and appropriate method 
as against "over-shooting or falling short of the target." 
Fourth, the holding of struggle meetings, either inside or outside 
the Party, should in general be stopped. The various defects and errors 
should be pointed out in the course of summing up and reviewing 
work. We should first deal with "the case" and then with "the person." 
We must first make clear the facts, the points at issue, the nature, 
the seriousness, and the cause of the errors and defects, and only then 
point out who are responsible for these defects and errors, and whose 
is the maj or responsibility and whose is the minor responsibility. 
We should not begin by inquiring as to who is responsible for these 
mistakes and errors. So long as a comrade commits an error unin-
tentionally and is fully aware of it, and is correcting it, we should 
receive him with open arms and should no longer be fastidious about 
it. In conducting inner-Party struggles, it is not our policy to deal 
blows at our cadres and comrades, or attack others or to deal them · 
blows. For such a policy would be in substance the same as the policy 
of applying" the whip and the repressive policy of the exploiting class 
in dealing with the working people. Our policy is the mutual assistance 
and mutual examination between cadres. 
For particularly mischievous comrades who frequently violate de-
cisions, discipline and Communist ethics, it is not impermissible, but 
sometimes even essential, to hold some specific trial meetings when 
it is found impossible to reason with them in matters of principle. 
But it would be wrong to make such a practice a general one. 
Fifth, every opportunity to appeal must be given to comrades who 
have been criticized or punished. As a rule, a comrade should be 
personally notified of all records or organizational conclusions that 
may be made about him, and these should be made in his presence. 
If he does not agree, then after discussion, the case may be referred 
to a higher authority. (In the case of anyone who expresses dissatisfac-
tion after having been punished the Party organization concerned must 
refer the case to a higher authority even if the comrade himself does 
not want to make an appeal.) No Party organization can prevent any 
comrade who has been punished from appealing to a higher authority. 
No Party member can be deprived of his right to appeal. No Party 
organization can withhold any appeal. 
On questions of ideology or principle the Party member concerned 
may appeal directly to a higher Party committee or even to the Cen-
tral Committee by going over the head of the Party organization to 
which he belongs. In making such an appeal the comrade, however, 
should first fully explain his VIews, his reasons and his differences 
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and make all these clear to his Party organization, before making his 
appeal to a higher authority. He should not keep his mouth shut in 
his Party organization while indulging in irresponsible talk with a 
higher Party organization in an attempt to deceive and fool the higher 
Party organization. Once an appeal has been made, the final decision 
rests with the higher Party organization, which may cancel, reduce 
or increase the disciplinary measures taken against a comrade by a 
Party committee of a lower level. 
On questions of ideology or principle, if agreement cannot be finally 
reached within the Party organization after discussion, the matter 
may be settled by a majority decision. After that, the minority who 
still hold different opinions may have the right to reserve their opinions 
on condition that they absolutely abide by the decision of the majority 
in respect to organizational matters and in their activities. 
When a Party committee of a higher level or a leading organ is 
asked by a certain number of comrades, or Party committees of a lower 
level, to hold a suitable meeting for the purpose of examining the 
work, the Party committee of a higher level should, whenever possible, 
call such a meeting to review its work. 
Sixth, a clear line should be drawn and a proper link should be 
established between struggles waged inside the Party and those waged 
outside the Party. A struggle waged outside the Party must not adopt 
the same forms as are used in inner-Party struggle, no~ vice versa. 
Particular care should be exercised to avoid taking advantage of out-
side forces and conditions in waging struggles against the Party or 
of intimidating the Party. All Party members. must take great care 
to maintain sharp vigilance lest the hidden Trotskyites and counter-
revolutionary elements should take advantage of the conflicts and 
struggles inside the Party to carryon their subversive activities. In 
conducting inner-Party struggles Party members must not allow them-
selves to be utilized by these elements. This can be done by strictly 
observing Party discipline and by carrying on the inner-Party struggle 
correctly. 
Inside the Party, only open struggles and ideological struggles are 
allowed. No form of struggle which violates the Party Constitution 
or Party discipline will be allowed. 
Seventh, in order to prevent unprincipled disputes within the Party, 
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it is necessary to lay down the following measures: 
I. Party members who disagree with the Party's leading body or any 
Party organization should submit their views and criticisms to the 
appropriate Party organization and should not talk about it casually 
among the masses. 
2. Party members who disagree with other Party members or certain 
responsible Party members, may criticize them in their presence or 
in certain specific Party organizations and should not talk about it 
casually. 
3. Party members or Party committees of a lower level who disagree 
with a Party committee of a higher level, may bring the issue to the 
Party committee of a higher level, or ask it to call a meeting to study 
the matter, or should refer the matter to a Party committee of a still 
higher level, but they should not talk about it casually or inform 
Party committees of a still lower level about the matter. 
4. When Party members discover any other Party member doing 
something wrong and acting in a manner detrimental to the interests 
of the Party they must report such activities to the appropriate Party 
organization and should not attempt to cover up the matter or attempt 
to mutually shield each other. 
5. Party members should promote an upright style of work and 
oppose anything of a deceitful nature, oppose any kind of deceitful 
talk and actions and should severely condemn all those who indulge 
in idle talk, gossiping, prying into other's secrets and the spreading 
of rumors. The leading bodies of the Party must from time to time 
issue instructions forbidding Party members to talk about certain 
specific matters. 
6. The leading bodies at all levels must from time to time summon 
those comrades who indulge in idle talk and unprincipled disputes 
and talk with them, correct them and warn them, or subject them to 
discipline in other ways. 
7. Party committees at all levels must respect the opinions set forth 
by Party members. They should frequently convene meetings to dis-
cuss questions and review their work, and provide Party members 
with ample opportunity to express their opinions. 
Unprincipled disputes should in general be forbidden and no judg-
ment should be passed on them, because it is impossible to judge who 
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is right and 'who is wrong in such unprincipled disputes. 
When we try to settle unprincipled disputes among the comrades 
we should never simply start to tackle the dispute itself, but should 
review and sum up their work and set forth in a positive way and 
from the standpoint of principle their future perspectives, program 
of work, the line to follow, plans, etc. In the course of the summing 
up of their work, and setting forth their future perspectives, program 
of work, the line to follow and plans, we can criticize the incorrect 
views of certain comrades, and then ask them if they still hold dif-
ferent views. If they do, then it is a dispute in principle. Thus, an 
unprincipled dispute will be raised to the level of a principled dispute. 
If they do not have any dispute in principle, then they will be asked 
to rally together around this summing up of work, these future per-
spectives and this program of work, and to struggle together for 
the fulfillment of the perspectives and program and to give up all 
unprincipled disputes. Unprincipled disputes should be settled through 
the summing up of past work, and the defining of present objectives, 
and the advancement of the current work. Otherwise, unprincipled 
disputes cannot be settled. 
We should never play the role of a judge in trying to settle an un-
principled dispute, because it is impossible of judgment and settle-
ment. If a judgment were not appropriate, both sides to the dispute 
would feel dissatisfied and the dispute would continue. 
Issues such as that a certain comrade does not fully trust another or 
still suspects another, etc., should in general not be brought up for 
discussion, because discussion on such issues will be of no avail. Such 
issues can be settled, and a particular comrade can be proved trust-
worthy and can be cleared of suspicion only in the course of his work, 
his struggle and his practice. 
If comrades introduce into their principled struggles certain unprin-
cipled elements we should only lay emphasis on the discussion of the 
principled question and should not lay emphasis on the unprincipled 
elements, otherwise the principled question will be overshadowed. 
If a comrade carries on an unprincipled struggle under the cloak 
of a principled struggle we must point out that he is correct in prin-
ciple on certain points, and we should not deny such principles be-
cause he is making use of them but we should appropriately point out 
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that his position and methods are wrong, and in this way prevent a 
principled struggle from being turned into an unprincipled struggle. 
All in all, inner-Party struggle is fundamentally a form of struggle 
and controversy over ideology and principles. Inside the Party every-
thing must submit to reason, everything must be reasoned out and 
everything must have some reason' for it, otherwise it will not do. We 
can do anything without difficulty if we have reasoned it out. 
Inside the Party we must cultivate the practice of submitting to 
reason. The yardstick for determining whether this or that reason 
is sound is: the interests of the Party and the interests of the proletar-
ian struggle; the subordination of the interests of the part to those 
of the whole, and the subordination of the immediate interests to 
long-range interests. All reasons and viewpoints are sound when they 
are beneficial to the interests of the Party, to the interests of the prole-
tarian struggle, to the long-range interests of the Party as a whole, 
and to the long-range interests of the proletarian struggle as a whole, 
otherwise they are not sound. Any struggle that does not submit to 
reason or that has no reason for it is an unprincipled struggle. Any-
thing that does not submit to reason or that cannot be reasoned out 
must be wrong and in such cases, no correct conclusions can be drawn 
and no ultimate solution can be found. If we still fail to reach agree-
ment after having reasoned it out, then it will be clear who is violating 
the interests of the Party and the interests of the proletarian struggle. 
It would then become necessary to draw organizational conclusions in 
the case of those comrades who persist in their errors, and the point 
at issue can be solved without difficulty. 
In order to enable us to reason things out it is essential to have 
inner-Party democracy and to straighten out problems by calm and 
dispassionate discussion. It is most essential for us to study humbly, 
to raise the theoretical level of the comrades, to have a clear idea of 
the situation, to make a thorough investigation of the case and to 
study problems carefully. We can never reason things out if we are 
careless, subjective, parrot-like, divorced from practice, making no 
thorough investigation of the case, etc. 
If we do not submit to reason, or if we fail to reason things out, 
then we will have to resort to force, tricks, the power granted by the 
Party, and even deceit, for the solution of problems. In that case, inner-
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Party democracy will no longer be necessary, lur inner-Party democ-
racy requires that we all reason things out so that we may take con-
certed action. 
What I mean by "reason" here, of course, is not empty and seemingly 
true reason, but real facts and the real truth that have been tested by 
practice. Certain intellectuals are given to idle talk a great deal with-
out basing themselves on facts. They can talk about everything under 
the sun. Theirs is empty talk, Party j argon and of no use whatsoever 
but is harmful to the Party and the revolution. Therefore, in promot-
ing the practice of submitting to reason, it is necessary to oppose empty 
talk and Party jargon, and to advocate objective and materialistic 
reasons which proceed from reality and are intended for practice. That 
is to say, "our theories are materialistic." 
Everything must submit to reason! It would not do if it didn't! 
It would not do either if we reason incorrectly! It would be even more 
undesirable if we indulge in empty talk! Of course, this is a rather 
difficult job. But only in this way can we become qualified as 
Bolsheviks. 
Bolsheviks suhmit to reason and they are supporters of truth. They 
are a kind of men who clearly understand reason and deal with others 
in real earnest in accordance with reason. They are not unreasonable 
and irrational struggle-specialists! 
These are some methods I suggest as to how to conduct inner-Party 
struggles. 
I am of the opinion" that our comrades should adopt these methods 
in conducting inner-Party struggles, in opposing the various kinds of 
incorrect tendencies inside the Party and in examining the Party spirit 
of every Party member, and especially that of the cadres, so that our 
Party may be still further consolidated ideologically and organiza-
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